For the sake of improving stability operations the world over, the debate surrounding Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) must relinquish arguments about legitimacy and instead contemplate regulation and increased response capability. Consider the following scenario.
Violence breaks out in a small African state. The local government collapses and reports emerge that civilians are being massacred by the tens of thousands. Refugees stream out in pitiable columns. As scenes reminiscent of the Rwanda genocide are played out on the world’s television screens once again, pressure mounts to do something. The UN’s calls for action fall on deaf ears. The US leadership remains busy with the war on terrorism and Iraq and decides the political risks of doing nothing are far lower than risking any American soldiers’ lives in what is essentially a mission of charity. Other nations follow its lead, unwilling to risk their own troops. As the international community dithers, innocent civilians die by the hour.
…at this point a private company steps forward with a novel offer. Using its own hired troops, the firm will establish protected safe havens where civilians can take refuge and receive assistance from international aid agencies. Thousands of lives might be saved. All the company asks is a cheque for $150 million.
The Brookings Institute’s Peter Singer presented this contrived, yet familiar scenario in 2003, hoping to spark an overdue debate on the legitimacy of PMSCs – a debate many found too distasteful to indulge. Countries that might intervene were struggling with the reality of the post-Cold War security environment and as reflected in this illustration: the focus was squarely on how to provide a military force to quell the fighting. Today, such a situation evokes a much broader, longer-term and holistic response, requiring extensive civil-military coordination.
Singer’s intent was to elicit a debate about how to save lives – not to understate the complexity of conflicts. However, his scenario not only fails to reflect the complexity of contemporary civil-military coordination, but it does not account for the evolving capabilities and dexterity of PMSCs. These companies have adapted; driven by the imperative to cater to their clients’ needs, while their business acumen enables them to vary their contribution as appropriate to the mission.
Restoring peace remains the primary task if (and when) this scenario repeats itself, however contemporary approaches dictate a broader and more protracted challenge than simply deploying an armed force – whether national military or PMSC. Any response would likely include:
- short-term peace enforcement;
- addressing the underlying source of the unrest;
- equitable aid delivery;
- repatriation of refugees/securing IDP camps;
- improved governance across all sectors;
- securing borders to contain instability and facilitate trade;
- redress the security sector:
- possibly purging corrupt/ineffective members of the forces; and
- recruiting/retraining to ensure future self-sufficiency in security.
The variety of the above tasks is not dissimilar to the PMSC sector’s diversification over the past decade as the industry adapted itself to the needs of its clients in the ever-changing security environment. Where Singer’s scenario demonstrated the combat-services capability of the PMSC industry, intervening authorities now devote a greater percentage of their efforts to complex, longer-term tasks. The PMSC industry’s diversification and specialisation means it can now provide:
- Logistical support to remote operations;
- Operation of checkpoints;
- Barrier “hardening”;
- De-mining services;
- Securing premises/government facilities;
- Armed convoy /security escorts;
- Intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination;
- Training of security forces, including:
- Infantry;
- Armoured;
- Police; and
- Border security forces;
- Penitentiary operation and staffing.
PMSC industry competition is also the key to mitigating (if not preventing) the shortage in funding and skills for stabilisation operations following the global economic downturn. Vital aspects of security and security sector reform need not be victims of economic-rationalism when the massively competitive market forces of the PMSC industry can be brought to bear.
Clients of PMSCs now include the governments of Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and even the United Nations, which has contracted PMSC services in Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Nepal and Sudan. In Afghanistan, the number of private security personnel is approximately 74,000 which outnumbered US military personnel prior to their recent troop surge.
Through their participation in the Swiss Government and International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) development of the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, States have acknowledged the potential contribution PMSCs can make to stabilisation. This document provides ‘best practices’ for states and their utilisation of PMSCs. The ICRC will now seek to work with governments to gain their responses/endorsement of the Montreux Document, hopefully focussing Australia’s debate over PMSCs on seeking the best methods of monitoring and governance.
PMSCs are a reality and the international community needs to adapt to their existence. If it does so, then PMSCs can be a boon for the management and prevention of conflicts. The sooner debate focuses on harnessing the power of PMSCs through regulation and governance, the sooner experiences like Blackwater in Iraq and Gaddafi’s hired thugs in Tripoli can be prevented and the response capability of the international community can receive a welcome boost. Whether those debates are the by-product of acquiescence or pragmatism, the chief concern is to improve our response and maintain or create stability.
Pushing this debate aside will not remove PMSCs from the landscape; they will continue to make exorbitant profits by operating in the manner they choose. Why? Because they’re been given free rein to do so.
Lyndon McCauley is an advisor in the Centre’s Multiagency Program.
This Civil-Military Commentary represents the views of the author and does not necessarily represent the view of the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence or the view of the Australian Government.