Civil-Military Commentary 4/2011: Civil-Military vocabulary – An uncommon language

The civil-military community is an enormous sphere; its number of actors is just as large and the interests of those who participate or commentate on the subject are wide and varied. To have such a broad representation across hundreds of states, militaries and international organisations is for the most part advantageous. If there is one facet of this expansive community that hinders civil-military activities, it is the variable use and interpretation of common terms that are used.

Variation in Terms

Take the term “civil-military coordination”, the most fundamental of terms in describing the interaction between civilian, military and police components and personnel.  A simple internet search will provide you with definitions of this term from the point of view of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,  the United Nations, the African Union, various academic institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and many of the world’s militaries and police forces.

Go deeper in your web-search and within the United Nations website you will find yet more definitions of civil-military coordination provided by the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and even the World Health Organisation. None of these are exactly the same. Why not? It is the most deep-seated concept in peace operations and security the world over, but in the simplest terms, none of these players have ensured they are talking about the same thing.

Variation by Application

The application of key terms will of course vary by user, but can also be time-sensitive. For example, the explanation of “peacemaking”, “peacekeeping”, “peace enforcement”  and “peace-building” are generally agreed, but the gradual metamorphosis from one to the next means that, at any particular point in time, operational activities may exemplify more than one of these terms and sometimes all of them.

The reasons for such divergence of terminology are not difficult to trace. The meanings of many civil-military terms are often subjective and their exact definitions may to an extent be elusive. It is counter-productive however, to interchange terms without recognising the distinction this implies – albeit subtle in some instances.

Although it is difficult to define many terms precisely, our use of phrases with similar-meanings often compounds the problem. We are sometimes casual in our use of certain phrases and habitually interchanging similar terms at leisure. Perhaps the ideal demonstration is the number of different words that are suffixed to the term “civil-military”. “Cooperation” and “coordination” are both terms with distinct definitions attached in UN Doctrine.  Other terms such as “relations”, “affairs”, “engagement”, “interaction”, and “effectiveness” are often tagged on in the hope of implying a similar meaning.

However, Australia’s strategic decision making cannot be informed by such casual and indistinct practices. Australia’s strategic decision makers must be provided with advice that has widespread and universal meaning within Australia’s civil-military field.

Why Does It Matter if I’m using a Different Term?

Civil-military terms and their eventual implications for resource allocation, capability development and investment in preparedness can be illustrated in the form of advice to strategic level decision makers. The following example shows the contested nature of terms across the civil-military community and the subsequent challenges for facilitating clear strategic decision making.

Security Sector Reform: A Dynamic Concept

Consider a hypothetical situation: following the fall of an African government, and with a United Nations Security Council mandated intervention imminent, the Secretary-General consults Australia’s Representative at the Permanent Mission in New York.   Aware of Australia’s recent experience in the Solomon Islands, the Secretary-General is keen to consider Australia’s advice. The Secretary General asks for a nominal contribution to any security sector reform (SSR) process that the international community will undertake in the affected country.  In Canberra, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade coordinates a Cabinet Submission (CABSUB) addressing the practical options for effective SSR, and considering options for a possible Australian contribution.

For the author of this CABSUB, the potential for confusion is enormous. SSR is a broad concept regardless of whose definition is applied, but when attempting to craft detailed national security advice to Cabinet, the need for terms to imply consistent meanings is tested across several Australian Government agencies and Ministers.

The question of which agencies to consult in drafting this CABSUB demonstrates the preliminary challenges inherent in civil-military terminology: what actual activities does SSR include; which Australian agencies should have input to any SSR provision; and do they apply the same definition? To illustrate the dynamic nature of the concept of SSR, a range of definitions is provided at the conclusion of this paper.

Compounding this, the SSR definition employed by the United Nations Secretary General might also have very different implications, not to mention that of the African country in question. A further reality is that Australia would need to consider the provision of SSR assistance in partnership with the African Union and other states (as well as the United Nations), some of which may have distinctly different doctrinal interpretations of SSR to ours.

Certain definitions of SSR limit activities in that area to the armed forces and the constabulary. Others draw a broader concept that includes reforms to intelligence agencies and border security forces, and others will further extend SSR to involve reforms to the judicial and penal sectors, including the need for appropriate civilian oversight of all these services. Such variation of terminology will likely exist with the many different Australian agencies able to contribute to SSR: AusAID, Attorney-General’s, Defence, Australian Federal Police, Customs, Quarantine, and so forth.

Coordinating this CABSUB will obviously be a highly complex undertaking considering the different definitions of SSR and contrasting cultures of each of these agencies. Even if an agreed definition is applied, any Australian contribution would likely be shaped by the political needs of the government, producing an SSR package that emphasises policy, legal, technical, training, materiel, financial or governance measures. Additionally, the costing of such a proposed response will inevitably be the subject of wrangling over which budget allocations will cover which activities.

Outside of any theoretical definitions and machinery of government challenges presented in this scenario, there is a further dynamic which Australia (or any responding state) must take into account. For all the definitions proffered on SSR, it is ultimately a ‘context-driven’ concept. The needs of an individual state, or a security agency of that state, determine the nature of the SSR in each instance and are partly immune to definitions – particularly definitions that attempt to prescribe exact actors and activities.

Brokering Consensus in Terminology

To craft a response to the UN’s request requires an appreciation of the dynamic elements of civil-military terminology, including the perspectives of: the UN Security Council, the UN Secretariat and the implementing UN agencies; the relevant Australian Government agencies; the partner nations working with Australia to provide any SSR package; and most importantly the specific needs and capacity of the affected State.

Australia’s response to this scenario hinges upon its ability to harmonise its working definition of SSR with that of the UN, then apply it to the areas of the subject country’s security sector that require reforms. It is then a matter of prioritising the greatest needs for the country in question given its security outlook and whether there is a need for development of particular capabilities, or combination of capabilities.

This example illustrates the inherent complexity of defining civil-military terms, given the often contested nature of key concepts, the influence of politics, the varying perspectives of key actors and the need for any definition to account for the context in which a term is being used. The unique circumstances that characterise each civil-military intervention are often the driver of any ambiguity attached to key terms. That is why it is essential that we as civil-military practitioners establish, to the greatest extent possible, a baseline for common terminology we use in informing critical decision making at the strategic level.

Development of the Common Language Guide in Australia

In advancing the findings of the Centre’s 2010 publication of Strengthening Australia’s Conflict and Disaster Management Overseas, the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence is working with departments and agencies to help bring clarity to the terminology that we employ in the Australian civil-military community. The Common Language Guide is being compiled to help provide a clear understanding of the language to help inform decision making for conflict and disaster management.

The inevitable differences in terminology employed by the international community, including the United Nations and our close allies, will continue. However by utilising a common language within Australian Government and non-government agencies, we can improve our focus, enhance our decision making processes and highlight the difference between our key terms and those used internationally, as well as the implications for future operations.

This Civil-Military Commentary represents the views of the author and does not necessarily represent the view of the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence or the view of the Australian Government.